Summary ValuJet Airlines flight 592 crashed due to a fire caused by expired oxygen generators in the cargo hold. The crash resulted in the loss of 110 lives, with recovery efforts hindered by the swampy Everglades. The accident led to the grounding of the entire airline fleet, regulatory changes for cargo holds, and a dedicated memorial in 1999.
It was May 11, 1996. ValuJet Airlines flight 592 was preparing for take-off. The inbound flight had arrived into Miami International Airport , Florida, late.
The McDonnell Douglas DC-9 had 105 passengers and 5 crew onboard. They were bound for Atlanta International Airport, Georgia. The flight crew The captain was Candalyn 'Candi' Kubeck, she had loved aviation from a young age and took flying lessons in high school.
She was an experienced pilot and had just turned 35, the day before. She was planning on celebrating with friends and family after the trip. She had previously worked for Eastern Airlines until they closed down.
The first officer was Richard Hazen, who was a retired military pilot and flight engineer in the US Air Force for 20 years. Love aviation history ? Discover more of our stories here! The flight attendants Lori Cushing, 36, who was described as a nice lady and a good student. She had moved in the fall, to take the flight attendant position.
Mandy Summers, 22, had been working for the airline since October the previous year. A week before, she'd told her parents she was giving up her job as a flight attendant. Jennifer Stearns, 21, had originally wanted to be a police officer, but her parents thought it was too dangerous.
She wasn't rostered the flight. A friend asked her to cover it for her. On the day The DC-9 was loaded with 4,109 pounds of cargo (baggage, mail, and company-owned material (COMAT)).
The COMAT consisted of two main tires and wheels, a nose tire and wheel, and five boxes that were described as "Oxy Cannisters -Empty." This cargo was loaded in the forward cargo compartment. The DC-9 left gate G2 just before 13:40.
They were one hour and four minutes late because of electrical and circuit breaker issues. The autopilot was inoperable and the left fuel flow gauge was broken. The flight attendants gave the safety briefing via a megaphone as the interphone system was not working.
They then secured the cabin and went to their jump seats. Disaster strikes within minutes At 14:04, the DC-9 departed runway 9L and climbed normally. At 14:10, there was suddenly a loud bang and smoke was appearing in the cabin.
The captain reported an electrical problem and said "we're losing everything" and asked to return to Miami. Passengers were starting to shout "Fire, fire, fire!" Lori tried to contact the flight crew, but the interphone was not working. She shouted "We need oxygen! We can't get oxygen back here!" Fire was now creeping through the cabin floor.
The first officer requested an immediate return to Miami and they started the descent. The controller asked the nature of the problem and the captain said "Fire" and the first officer said "Smoke in the cabin". Lori went into the cockpit and shouted "Completely on fire!" and slammed the door shut, as to not let any more smoke into the flight deck.
The aircraft slowly lost power as the electrical and flight controls systems deteriorated. The first officer asked the controller for the nearest airport, but it was too late. They fought to the end but were probably incapacitated by fire and smoke.
Flight 592 disappeared from the radar at 14:13:42. It was just three minutes since the issue started. The aftermath The aircraft banked sharply to the right before rolling on its side and nose diving into the Everglades at over 500 miles per hour.
The DC-9 disintegrated on impact. Witnesses said there was no visible damage, smoke or fire to the aircraft, and it just disappeared when it hit the swamp. There was nothing left, just small pieces of scattered debris, a piece of the engine and a pool of jet fuel.
Recovery was almost impossible due to the location in the swampy Everglades and the confetti-like pieces of debris. The recovery of the souls on board was just as difficult as no remains were intact. Not everyone could be identified.
All 110 souls perished. Investigation findings The NTSB determined that the fire developed in the forward cargo hold below the forward galley. The fire burned through the cabin floor causing instruments and cables to fail.
It was caused by expired chemical oxygen generators that were stowed in the hold. It was a violation of Federal Aviation Regulations prohibiting the transport of hazardous materials in passenger aircraft. The investigation discovered that the generators were activated by a jolt during taxi and they began to produce heat and activated the other canisters which then started a fire with other materials including the aircraft tires.
The cargo hold usually suppresses fire, but the oxygen produced by the canisters fueled the fire. There were no smoke detectors in the hold. The canisters were mislabeled and improperly stored as hazardous cargo.
The airline had a poor safety record and the accident brought more attention to the airline's woes. The entire ValuJet fleet was grounded for several months after. They were known for their aggressive cost-cutting measures.
The flight attendants were recruited by the wife of ValuJet's president. "I've sure gone through the whole spectrum of emotions, from being depressed to being really ticked off. From first hand experience with the company, I've seen them cut corners on safety.
" Former ValuJet flight attendant who knew the crew members (as reported to The Daily Press) Read More: Air Niugini Flight 73 - A Cabin Crew Perspective Outcome and change ValuJet were grounded but flew again in September the same year. The following year, they acquired Air Tran and changed their name as they never recovered from the accident. Air Tran was later bought by Southwest Airlines.
The NTSB apportioned the blame to: SabreTech, for improperly packaging and storing hazardous materials. ValuJet, for not supervising SabreTech. The FAA, for not mandating smoke-detection and fire-suppression systems in cargo holds as recommended in 1988 after a similar incident.
In 1998, the FAA changed the regulations, revising the standards of cargo holds to have both smoke detection and fire suppression equipment, which would make an accident like ValuJet flight 529 recoverable. In 1999, a memorial was dedicated to the victims in the Everglades. The memorial, consisting of 110 concrete pillars, is located just north of Tamiami Trail in Miami-Dade County.
It points to the location of the crash site 12 miles to the north-northeast. Students designed the memorial, and local contractors, masons and labor unions built it at no cost. Related: Varig Flight 820 - A Cabin Crew Perspective.
