“Every four years, big brother is also getting bigger,” a Southeast Asian official succinctly commented on the intersection of U.S. elections and China’s growing influence on the sidelines of a conference in Jakarta in the runup to upcoming polls pitting Donald Trump against Kamala Harris.
To be sure, Southeast Asian states are all too familiar with the vicissitudes of four-year U.S. presidential cycles, and U.
S. policymakers have themselves had to manage regional perceptions of perceived commitment shifts for decades, amid the reality of Washington’s longstanding presence. But such characterizations nonetheless epitomize the hard realities that lie ahead for U.
S. Southeast Asia policy, irrespective of the election results next month. Southeast Asian states are no strangers to ebbs, flows, and imbalances in U.
S. commitment, despite the oft-cited bipartisan consensus on U.S.
Asia policy. While administrations have pursued the same general post-World War II objective of creating a more stable world while preventing the rise of a rival hegemon in Asia, the way each has thought about power, ranked threats, and translated capabilities into commitment has varied amid evolving developments including the end of the Vietnam War, the September 11 attacks or China’s rise as the U.S.
“pacing challenge.” These shifts are often felt more by regions like Southeast Asia, which still do not receive the attention they deserve inside and outside of government, relative to China, J.
