The previous article looked at some studies of the relationship between China’s aid and its influence that posit a mediating role for domestic political institutions. Early empirical research suggests that this kind of analytic lens is relevant to the Pacific. This is a region that comprises countries with largely open — albeit in some cases small and often fragile – domestic political institutions and one in which China has increased its aid effort over the last decade.
While China appears to have been successful in using aid and other economic inducements to help persuade several Pacific island countries (PICs) to shift their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China in recent years, its ability to extract more “expensive” policy concessions has been limited. In 2022, China failed in what was reported as a concerted and sustained attempt to secure a region-wide policing and security deal with the Pacific Islands Forum countries. The announcement of a non-public bilateral security and policing agreement between China and Solomon Islands earlier that year became the focus of a subsequent domestic political backlash against the government of former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare.
The newly elected government of Fiji downgraded its own policing co-operation with China in the wake of the Solomon Islands agreement. These examples may reflect China’s inability to date to secure a wider “social licence” from local communities in PICs.
