Summary The flight crew failed to follow SOPs and checklists, leading to an unstable approach and disregarded all warnings. The cabin crew demonstrated heroism by assisting passengers who were severely injured or trapped during the evacuation. The fatal crash's cause was attributed to the crew's loss of situational awareness and inadequately briefed approach, with lapses in communication and CRM.
It was September 28, 2018. Air Niugini flight 073 was flying from Pohnpei to Chuuk airport in Micronesia before heading to Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea. The Boeing 737-8BK had 35 passengers on board and unusually, 12 crew.
What was about to happen would shock the world but be something of a miracle too. Love aviation history ? Discover more of our stories here! The crew The pilot in command that day was an experienced captain from Papua New Guinea. The first officer was from Australia.
There was also a flight engineer seated in the jumpseat, who ironically filmed the extraordinary event on his cell phone. A loadmaster was also onboard. Usually, there would be a minimum of four cabin crew on the aircraft, but on this day, there were eight.
The team was led by the purser referred to as (CC1), the senior crew member in the economy (CC2), the cabin crew (CC3), the trainee (CC4), the cabin crew (CC5), the trainer (CC6), the check staff (CC7) and observing check staff (CC8). CC6 was the only male cabin crew member; most of the crew had over 10,000 flying hours. They were aged between 27 and 58.
Take-off and flight The take-off and subsequent flight were normal and uneventful, although they had departed twenty minutes late. The flight was now on the final approach and the captain had announced "Prepare the cabin for arrival". Before passing the ' cabin secure ' to the purser and captain, the cabin crew would have secured the cabin, making sure that passengers were wearing seatbelts and that everything was stowed safely.
They would then make sure that the galley was secure and take their seats for landing. The purser and CC3 were seated by the main cabin door (L1) and CC2 and CC5, were seated at the rear left door (L2). CC4 and CC6 were seated at jumpseats at the rear right door (R2) and CC7 and CC8 were seated at seats 1A and 4D, respectively.
Want answers to more key questions in aviation? Check out the rest of our guides here What happened? Prior to the top of descent, the flight crew briefly discussed brake setting for the landing and discussed the approach and landing setting of Flaps 40. They discussed the approach and missed approach procedure they would conduct if they found themselves not visual by that point. However, the approach and landing checklist and the briefing on the RNAV approach were not conducted in accordance with standard operating procedures.
At the top of descent, the captain said that they were too high and needed to immediately initiate their descent. They commenced descent and the first officer asked for a weather report. The aircraft was then configured for the approach.
At 1000 feet the aircraft was stable but above the 3 degrees glidepath. The captain disconnected the auto-pilot and said he was going back on profile. On descent, the aircraft entered a storm cell and heavy rain.
'Sink Rate' and 'Glideslope' warnings sounded in the cockpit and alarming 17 times. They disregarded the alerts and did not acknowledge the minimums and became fixated on landing cues and control inputs. They passed the missed approach point and it wasn't until the first officer realized they were at 100 feet, that they were too low.
The aircraft impacted a lagoon at 09:24 local time, 1,500 feet from the runway. The aircraft deflected across the water, spun around 210 degrees before finally settling. Boats of local fishermen, the Red Cross, and the US Navy were quickly at the scene.
The evacuation Water had started to pour into the cabin as there was a break in the fuselage, just behind the wings. The emergency lights did not come on, so the cabin was dark. The cabin crew shouted their commands, "Evacuate-Evacuate" but there was some confusion, the passengers didn't seem to understand, so they shouted "Get Out, Get Out" instead.
The purser had opened her exit and pulled a life raft out that was stowed in the business class ceiling. CC3 went to help but it would not inflate. They kicked it away so it would not obstruct the evacuation.
CC5 was responsible for opening the overwing exits but seated at the rear, so struggled with the tide of passengers trying to leave the aircraft. She used mild force to get past them and open the exits. Passengers at the overwing exits were annoyed that CC5 insisted that they leave all baggage behind, but some still took their luggage with them.
The cabin crew seated at the rear of the aircraft, had difficulty reaching their flashlights and lifejackets under their seats as the stowage was underwater. Some passengers could not reach their lifejackets, so cabin crew gave out spare ones assisted by the loadmaster. The water in the cabin was now over knee height.
Saving lives CC2 found a passenger underwater in the aisle and lifted him above the water level. The passenger had been seated in 22A and was seriously injured. CC4 went to help her and then rolled him over a seat armrest which allowed for the ingested water to come out of his mouth and nose.
With the help of CC6, they managed to get him out of one of the leftover wing exits and onto a boat. Back in the cabin, CC6 found a passenger still strapped in his seat at 17F. He unfastened the seatbelt and dragged him to the left rear overwing exit, two passengers on the wing helped pull him out and onto a boat.
The water was still rising and had almost reached the front of the cabin. The flight crew were still in the cockpit, and the purser hammered at the door and shouted for them to come out. The flight engineer and first officer left by the main door L1 and jumped into a boat.
The purser and the captain shouted to the US Navy divers inside the aircraft to leave. Finally, the captain and the purser left the aircraft. CC5 and CC6 and 28 passengers escaped the aircraft via an exit on the left overwing.
Six of these passengers were injured and helped out the exits onto boats. CC1 and CC3, the captain, first officer, and flight engineer escaped from L1. The US Navy divers, six passengers, CC2, CC4, CC7, CC8, and the loadmaster escaped from the right rear overwing exit.
The aftermath The main landing gear separated from the aircraft on impact and there was a break in the fuselage between rows 17 and 22. The CVR was ejected from the rear cargo area. The aircraft sank into 90 feet of water before resting on the seabed.
Jet fuel bled into the lagoon. Sadly, there was one fatality, who was seated in 23A. He was found three days later by divers between rows 22 and 23.
He had blunt-force trauma to his face and head and had not been wearing a seatbelt. He would have had severe concussion and died within minutes of the impact. but not by drowning.
Six passengers were severely injured but recovered from the accident. How did a turboprop airliner crash into a highway just minutes after takeoff? Cause of the accident The final report said that the flight crew did not comply with Air Niugini Standard Operating Procedures, nor the approach or pre-landing checklists, and did not adequately brief the approach. The flight path became unstable after autopilot disconnect.
The flight crew heard, but disregarded, thirteen Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS). The pilots lost situational awareness. The approach was unstabilized, but the captain did not execute a missed approach.
The first officer was ineffective and oblivious to the rapidly unfolding unsafe situation. The Papua New Guinea Civil Aviation Safety Authority was also criticized. The flight engineer's phone recording of the accident was used during the investigation.
A brave crew but a terrible tragedy..
